The 2025 Czech Parliamentary elections marked the return of Andrej Babiš and his populist ANO movement to government. For Ukraine, this shift is expected to translate into a more cautious and low-profile approach from the Czech Republic. In a new policy brief published by the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), Peace Research Center Prague researcher Vojtěch Bahenský examines both the political willingness and the military capability of the Czech Republic to contribute to a potential Coalition of the Willing or a future Multinational Force Ukraine (MFU). The analysis forms part of NUPI’s broader series assessing the conditions under which allied states might deploy military personnel in or around Ukraine.
Political willingness
While the outgoing center-right government of Petr Fiala was known for its early support to Kyiv, including military aid, an early visit to Kyiv or the coordination of the ammunition initiative, the new ANO-led coalition is expected to adopt a more cautios stance, with a stronger emphasis on the electorate’s views. The draft Programme Statement of the Government, formed by ANO and two minor populist right-wing coalition partners, does not mention any military support for Ukraine nor does it clearly state Russia as the aggressor. Instead, it promises to “support diplomatic steps leading to ending the War in Ukraine and eliminating the risk of war in Europe.”
Vojtěch Bahenský states that“while a complete turnaround of Czech policy towards Ukraine is very unlikely, the incoming government can be expected to balance international reputation with appeasing domestic public opinion. The policy is therefore likely to grow more passive and lowprofile. Deploying troops to Ukraine seems like a too high-profile action. Existence of stable ceasefire or peace agreement would certainly be a minimum required condition for any serious discussion on troop commitments.”
These political contraints are further reinforced by public opinion trends. Recent polling also indicates that a narrow majority of ANO voters want the new government to stop providing military and financial support to Ukraine, while another sizeable share prefers reducing it. Among voters of the far-right SPD, support for ending such assistance reaches around 80%. Although President Petr Pavel has voiced backing for potential Czech participation in an MFU, his ability to influence this decision will be limited once the new government gains the parliamentary vote of confidence, leaving him with mostly informal leverage and little ability to drive a military deployment on his own.
Military capabilities
Beyond political considerations, the Czech Republic’s ability to contribute meaningfully to a military mission in Ukraine is constrained by its limited force structure. As a landlocked country, Prague could contribute only land or air assets, and even these face significant limitations. The Czech Armed Forces lack around seven thousand personnel relative to pre-2022 targets, meaning that any land-force deployment would likely be small in scale and focused on supportive or humanitarian roles, such as training or demining, rather than frontline operations.
Air contributions would likewise be modest. The Czech Air Force’s current fleet of 14 JAS-39 Gripens could sustain only a limited deployment of 4–5 aircraft without rotation, similar to Czech participation in Baltic air-policing missions. Although the country is in the process of acquiring 24 F-35s, these will not arrive until the 2030s, making larger or longer-term deployments unrealistic given ongoing domestic airspace protection duties.
Vojtěch Bahenský then concludes that “at present, any Czech participation in a Coalition of the Willing operation in Ukraine appears unlikely. The electorate of the new coalition is divided: while a majority supports NATO membership for Ukraine, many also favor reduced Czech support to Ukraine.”
This document is part of NUPI’s series of 16 expert policy briefs examining the Multinational Force Ukraine. The series explores the main conditions shaping potential participation, focusing on both political willingness and the military capabilities needed to deploy forces, whether on land, in the air, or at sea, to create a military presence in or around Ukraine.