This report was prepared in collaboration with the Centre for Public Finance in June 2025. The report is in Czech.

Higher defense spending represents a necessary precondition for strengthening the defense capability of the Czech Republic. In 2024, the country fulfilled the NATO commitment for the first time by spending 2% of GDP on defense (167 billion CZK). However, a significant increase in this commitment is expected, up to the level of 5% of GDP by 2032.

1. Scenarios of increasing defense expenditures and their current structure

Raising spending to the level of 5% of GDP would mean more than double the current level, i.e. over 300 billion CZK annually (in today’s prices). Two categories are beginning to be distinguished, modeled according to the Czech state budget for 2025:

• Traditional defense expenditures: proposed target of 3.5% of GDP, currently about 1.7% of GDP. Covers, for example, armaments, equipment, personnel, information technology, supplies, or energy.

• Other security expenditures: target of 1.5% of GDP, modeled at 0.2% of GDP, but other items will likely be included (cybersecurity, infrastructure, etc.).

2. Financing options

To secure the necessary resources, we propose short-term use of debt or temporary increases in selected taxes, and in the long term structural reforms mainly on the revenue side (through new higher taxation).

3. Key challenges in financing Czech defense

To manage the increase in spending, it is necessary to focus on three key areas:

• Efficiency and transparency: Possible and essential for maintaining public support.

• Personnel and material capacities: Require strengthening — it is necessary to secure higher numbers of soldiers and civilian capacities; acquisitions must not be lengthy — processes must be accelerated.

• Public communication: Explaining the reasons and providing a clear overview of expenditures, commitments, and goals will help maintain public support.

4. Efficiency and transparency

A number of oversight mechanisms already exist: internal audits, parliamentary committees, or independent institutions (Supreme Audit Office, expenditure reviews, etc.). The task is to ensure three-phase oversight: preliminary, ongoing, and ex-post, and to start a debate on increasing transparency and efficiency without endangering security or slowing down key state defense preparations.

Efficiency should be seen on a scale (not binary: efficient/inefficient) and in a broader geopolitical and strategic context. Special attention is recommended for expenditures allocated to the category of other security expenditures. These also represent an opportunity for strategic investments with a multiplier effect, especially in the area of innovation and technological development.

This report was prepared in collaboration with the Centre for Public Finance in April 2025. The report is in Czech.

Our goal is to improve the quality of public debate and political decision-making on defense spending in the Czech Republic in the context of a changing international security environment. To this end, we are preparing a series of expert studies that will address specific aspects of this issue.

In this introductory study, we primarily attempt to identify key issues for public debate and offer working versions of answers that we intend to examine in greater detail in our subsequent studies.

The first issue we address is the question of whether the Czech Republic is spending enough on defense.

In this introductory study, we primarily attempt to identify key issues for public debate and offer working versions of answers that we intend to address in more detail in our future work:

1. Why do we need defense spending and what is it for? To ensure the security of Czech citizens against external threats. Most of the spending stems from the need to meet collective defense goals within NATO's defense planning.

2. What is our current defense spending? Defense spending has grown from approximately 1% of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2016 to 2% of GDP in 2024. The increase in expenditure to approximately 160 billion in 2024 has moved us from significantly below average to slightly below average among EU countries.

3. How high should defense spending be and when should it be increased? In the long term, it will be necessary to achieve defense spending in the range of 2-5% of GDP, with 3% of GDP corresponding to the expected new political commitment within NATO. In the coming years, spending higher than the long-term target will be necessary if the underfunding of previous years is to be quickly made up.

4. How can we finance defense spending? There are three basic options for financing higher defense spending: lower spending in other budget items, higher government revenues, and higher debt.

5. What questions regarding defense spending need to be answered? Discussions related to increasing defense spending are closely linked to issues of monitoring the effectiveness of funds spent, the predictability and stability of spending, growth potential, and transparency.

This report from the Experimental Lab for International Security Studies (ELISS) offers results of a cross-national survey regarding public support for nuclear arms control with Russia and China, in the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Poland. Furthermore, the survey included an embedded experiment investigating cross-national attitudes toward nuclear and chemical weapon use.

Conducted in collaboration with IPSOS s.r.o., the research collected data rom the four aforementioned countries from 5002 respondents altogether in the timeframe from September to October 2023.

Key Takeaways: General

• Although respondents from all countries report rather limited knowledge on nuclear arms control, there is a remarkably high level of support for new arms control treaties with both Russia and China.

• While there is a certain element of mistrust, the public both in the United States and Europe are, for the most part, willing to engage in nuclear deal talks with Russia and China.

Key Takeaways: Arms control with Russia

• Over 90% of respondents in all five countries (except for France, with 85%) found the New START Treaty important for the security of their countries.

• Over 85% of respondents across all five countries reported agreement with the creation of a new arms control treaty with Russia.

• Western public sees a potential new arms control treaty with Russia as a preventative measure aimed at reducing the risk of a potential nuclear war between the US and Russia.

• Russia’s behavior toward Ukraine was not perceived as a potential obstacle to negotiating a new treaty by the majority of respondents

• There is a consistent concern across all five countries that Russia would cheat and renege on its treaty obligations, which was seen as the most compelling reason against a new deal by more than one-third of respondents in all countries.

Key Takeaways: Arms control with China

• Almost 90% of respondents from all five countries approve of an idea of a new arms control deal with China.

• The leading reason for a new arms control treaty is a lower risk of a nuclear conflict and positive impact US-China relations.

• More than one-third of respondents in all countries believe the most compelling reason against negotiating a nuclear deal with China is the probability of China cheating.

The research involved contributions from Michal Smetana, Ondřej Rosendorf, Marek Vranka and Zakir Rzazade.

This report from the Herzl Center for Israel Studies and the Peace Research Center Prague offers an in-depth analysis of the evolving attitudes of the Czech public and political elites towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Conducted in collaboration with IPSOS s.r.o., the research spans two waves of public opinion surveys in January 2023 and January 2024, as well as a survey of political elites at the turn of 2022-2023.

Key findings reveal a notable increase in the Czech public's interest in Israel-related news and a rise in support for recognizing Palestine as an independent state, alongside a distinct polarization in opinions regarding the historical and current responsibilities in the conflict.

The report highlights that approximately one-third of Czechs believe both nations share equal blame for the conflict's origins. However, there is a growing tendency to attribute more responsibility to Palestinians, with 21% of Czechs holding this view—an increase of 6 percentage points from 2023. Similarly, views on the conflict's continuation show significant division.

Additionally, the report confirms that Czech political elites (regardless of their party affiliation) are more often pro-Israeli in their attitudes than the average Czech population. The Czech society is, however, also traditionally more pro-Israeli, which can be seen with 37% Czechs sympathizing more with Israel after the attack on October. Moreover, 44% respondents agree with Israel’s actions in the conflict, while 42% approve of Israel’s demands.

The research involved contributions from Irena Kalhousová, Tereza Plíštilová, Sarah Komasová, Michal Smetana and Marek Vranka.

By Alice Nováková, Karim Kamel & Elin Bergner

Nuclear risk reduction and Feminist Foreign Policy (FFP) might, at first glance, seem fundamentally at odds. Nuclear risk reduction operates within existing security frameworks, focusing on incremental diplomatic and technical measures to prevent the use of nuclear weapons. FFP, on the other hand, seeks to disrupt power hierarchies and reframe security through justice, inclusivity, and human-centered approaches. However, these frameworks are not contradictory — with its focus on communication and cooperative approaches, FFP can support present operational and technical nuclear risk reduction efforts while facilitating a shift from a reliance on deterrence and coercion to cooperative peace.

This paper argues that aligning the pragmatic tools of nuclear risk reduction with the transformative principles of FFP can address gaps in vision and implementation, paving the way for resilient, inclusive, and human-centered risk reduction efforts with the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament.

By Michal Onderčo and Robin E. Möser

This working paper examines how African civil society can strengthen its role in global nuclear disarmament debates. It identifies three main barriers: restrictive visa policies, exclusionary expert language, and lack of funding. The authors propose hosting events in accessible locations, simplifying technical jargon, and providing financial support to enhance inclusivity and amplify African voices in nuclear policy discussions​.

By Michal Smetana, Marek Vranka & Ondřej Rosendorf

The influence of American public opinion on Cold War-era arms control talks, particularly between the United States and the Soviet Union, is well-documented. Public pressure led to significant arms control agreements, including the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 and major treaties in the late 1980s. However, recent developments, like Moscow's suspension of the New START Treaty and Russia's deployment of nuclear weapons in Belarus, alongside China's unregulated nuclear expansion, pose new challenges. With the future of nuclear arms control in question, this paper examines whether the U.S. public supports engaging in arms control talks with Russia and China. An original survey reveals that, despite limited knowledge of specific agreements, Americans overwhelmingly support arms control, driven by bipartisan concerns over nuclear war and compliance risks.

By Jan Hornát

Generative artificial intelligence (AI) will likely impact all aspects of the human experience and international relations are no exception. Decision-making in foreign policy is contingent on the availability of information, which is, however, often scarce. As a supporting tool for policymakers, states have come to employ various methods of foresight and scenario-building in order to better understand and evaluate the behavior of adversaries and the possible results of their own decisions. It is particularly the domain of foresight and data-informed diplomacy, where generative AI could significantly impact the decision-making process. This paper first maps out how generative AI can be leveraged to serve as a “hyper-informed” forecaster and advisor to foreign policymakers and then proceeds to problematize the said developments. Ethical and practical issues related to deterrence and decision-making authority of AI in the chain of command are then discussed as the new security dilemmas of AI integration into policymaking.