Tobias Risse’s first global quantitative study of the relationship between states’ level of liberal democracy and their support for arms control finds that democracies back conventional arms control regardless of the initiator but support nuclear control only if led by democracies.
Michal Smetana, Marek Vranka, and Ondřej Rosendorf explore public support for arms control in the third nuclear age, arguing its complexity lowers awareness. People rely on simple heuristics, making opinions elastic and open to “elite cues” from experts and politicians shaping attitudes.
We are thrilled to share that Zakir Rzazade has been awarded the Best Paper Prize for Ph.D. students and early-career scholars at this year’s European Initiative for Security Studies (EISS) annual conference. Congratulations, Zakir!
Vyšší výdaje na obranu jsou nezbytným předpokladem pro posílení obranyschopnosti Česka. Očekává se však výrazné navýšení závazku NATO z 2 % HDP až na úroveň 5 % HDP do roku 2032. Jakým způsobem to efektivně financovat, představuje nová studie Centra veřejných financí a PRCP.
Do rivalries with major powers undermine global arms control? Tobias Risse reveals how power imbalances shape negotiations, discouraging non-major powers from supporting arms control when pitted against stronger rivals. His analysis uncovers a crucial role of power relations in arms control negotiations.
Our researcher Lucie Kadlecová and Viktor Paggio published an article titled Russia’s Weak Spots in Cyber Sovereignty: How the West Can Keep Russian Citizens’ Access to Online Information Free from the Kremlin Interference. It summarizes how Russia pushes its take on cyber sovereignty and which aspects these initiatives lack.
Alice Nováková, Karim Kamel, and Elin Bergner argue that integrating Feminist Foreign Policy into nuclear risk reduction can shift security paradigms toward cooperation and human-centered approaches, addressing systemic inequalities and offering inclusive policy paths toward nuclear disarmament.
This article from Dr. Rob Geist Pinfold examines Israel’s intelligence failures and successes in its ongoing conflict with Hamas. It distinguishes between occasional (intelligence assessments) and causal factors (structural and political inputs). Critically, it illustrates that Israel’s intelligence agencies deferred to the prevailing, but incorrect, assumptions and short-sighted policy priorities set by the Prime Minister’s Office. The authors also explore the over-reliance on technical intelligence, the lack of structural reform and the militarised nature of Israel’s intelligence cycle.
