Can public opinion influence decision-makers’ views on nuclear weapon use? Our new article, published in the European Journal of International Security, finds that public support significantly increases policymakers’ willingness to endorse the first use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear adversaries. Moreover, public backing influences beliefs about whether national leaders would actually order a nuclear strike. However, this effect weakens in contexts involving nuclear retaliation, suggesting that once the “nuclear taboo” has been broken, other factors become more salient. Notably, favorable public opinion also enhances perceptions of the credibility of third-party nuclear threats, carrying important implications for nuclear deterrence strategy.
Drawing on an original survey experiment conducted among UK parliamentarians and U.S. and UK government policy officials, the study presented participants with three hypothetical scenarios that varied the level of public support for nuclear strikes:
A potential first use of nuclear weapons in response to an Iranian chemical attack;
Retaliatory nuclear use following a North Korean nuclear strike;
Observation of a third-party nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan.
In the Iran scenario, public support had a clear and consistent impact: when participants were told that the public favored nuclear strikes, they were significantly more likely to endorse nuclear use themselves and to believe their country would do so.
Findings from the North Korea scenario were more mixed. Public opinion influenced UK government officials but had no statistically significant effect among U.S. officials or UK parliamentarians.
Finally, across all groups, India’s nuclear threats were viewed as more credible when accompanied by strong public support.
Because the use of nuclear weapons would represent an escalation unprecedented since World War II with profound global consequences, it is crucial to understand the factors shaping such decisions. Despite the importance of this issue, there has been limited experimental evidence on whether policymakers are responsive to public attitudes about nuclear use. This research addresses that gap, providing the first experimental demonstration that political elites are at least partially influenced by public sentiment when considering high-level decisions involving nuclear weapons.